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Abstract
School accountability schemes require measures of school performance,
and these measures are in practice often based on pupil test scores. It is
well-known that insu¢ ciently correcting these test scores for pupil char-
acteristics may provide incentives for pupil selection. Building further
on results from the theory of fair allocation, we show that the trade-o¤
between reward and pupil selection is not only a matter of su¢ cient infor-
mation. A school accountability scheme that rewards school performance
will create incentives for pupil selection, even under perfect information,
unless the educational production function satises an (unrealistic) sepa-
rability assumption. We propose di¤erent compromise solutions and dis-
cuss the resulting incentives in theory. The empirical relevance of our
analysis i.e., the rejection of the separability assumption and the magni-
tude of the incentives in the di¤erent compromise solutions is illustrated
with Flemish data. The traditional value-added model turns out to be an
acceptable compromise.
Keywords: school accountability, cream-skimming, educational produc-
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1 Introduction
Public education used to have some common features around the world. Schools
often received funding per pupil and had limited autonomy, inspectors controlled
the quality of education, and school choice by parents was often restricted.
Critics argued that these features explained the poor performance of (some)
public schools.
School accountability increased in several countries to improve student learn-
ing. In the U.S., for example, the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 forced
all states to set up an accountability system for public schools. In some states
schools had to publish report cards information about their performance based
on pupil test scores to inform parental school choice. Other states used nan-
cial bonuses or sanctions depending on school performance.
School accountability improved pupil test scores, but it is unclear whether ex-
plicit nancial bonuses and sanctions are necessary (Wössmann, 2003; Hanushek
and Raymond, 2004, 2005; Jacob, 2005; Figlio and Rouse, 2006; West and Pe-
terson, 2006; Burgess et al., 2007; Chiang, 2009). Accountability can also result
in potentially undesirable strategic reactions such as teaching to the rating,
student retainment, removal of low-achieving students, and even adapting the
caloric content of the school lunches at the testing date (Jacob, 2005; Figlio and
Winicki, 2005; Burgess et al., 2005; Reback, 2008). In a nutshell, the overall
success of incentive-based reforms depends crucially on their design.
We focus on one possible strategic reaction of schools, pupil selection. The
average test score in a school strongly depends on the characteristics of the
pupil population. Insu¢ ciently correcting for pupil characteristics may lead
to a biased evaluation of school performance (Meyer, 1997; Ladd and Walsh,
2002; Hanushek and Raymond, 2003; Taylor and Nguyen, 2006; Neal, 2008).
Moreover, it can give incentives to schools to appear more attractive for specic
student groups. Pupil selection may then improve the measured performance of
a school without adding real skills.
There is a fundamental conict between rewarding schools and avoiding pupil
selection, irrespective of whether the information to su¢ ciently correct for pupil
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characteristics is available.1 This problem is formally similar to the well-known
conict between responsibility and compensation axioms in the theory of
fair allocation and equality of opportunity (see, e.g., Fleurbaey, 2008). While the
latter theory is focused on the allocation of resources to individuals, we apply
it to a setting in which resources have to be allocated to institutions, more
specically schools. A similar extension of the model to health insurance was
already explored by Schokkaert et al. (1998) and Schokkaert and Van de Voorde
(2004, 2009). These applications illustrate the exibility of the fair allocation
approach. In fact, from an ethical point of view, it may be better acceptable to
impose some responsibility on institutions, rather than on individuals.
In section 2 we show that it is possible to reward schools with a higher
output and eliminate incentives for pupil selection, but only if the educational
production function satises an (unrealistic) separability assumption. In gen-
eral a trade-o¤ is inevitable and we propose therefore some compromise solu-
tions. These are closely related to the conditional-egalitarian and the egalitarian-
equivalent solutions in the theory of fair allocation (Fleurbaey, 2008). One family
of solutions rewards schools for good administration, but does not necessarily
eliminate all pupil selection. The well-known value-added scheme is a special
case. The other family avoids pupil selection, but does not necessarily reward
schools for good administration. In section 3 we illustrate the empirical rel-
evance of the trade-o¤ and simulate the incentives provided by the di¤erent
compromise solutions with empirical data for Flanders (the northern part of
Belgium). The value-added scheme turns out to be an attractive compromise
solution. Section 4 concludes.
2 Accountability and incentives
We construct a simple model to show the incompatibility between on the one
hand creating incentives for higher test scores and on the other hand avoiding
incentives for pupil selection. To bring the key trade-o¤ into focus we start from
the most favorable informational assumptions. We assume that su¢ cient data
are available at the pupil level, as it is already well known that informationally
1We will focus on school nancing schemes, but the question is equally relevant for the
design of report cards. It could also be relevant for designing di¤erentiated vouchers (Epple
and Romano, 2008).
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less demanding accountability schemes cannot su¢ ciently correct for di¤erences
in pupil characteristics (Meyer, 1997; Hanushek and Raymond, 2003). Fur-
thermore the selection of relevant pupil test scores and their aggregation (over
di¤erent dimensions and pupils) into a cardinal and comparable indicator of
school output is assumed to be settled (Cawley et al., 1999; Neal, 2008). We
also neglect the problem that school output measures are typically less reli-
able for small schools (Kane and Staiger, 2002). Introducing these optimistic
assumptions strengthens our impossibility result.
2.1 Preliminaries
The agreed measure of school output y 2 R is a function of school variables de-
noted by x 2 X; we write y = f(x). School variables consist of administration
variables a 2 A and background variables b 2 B; we write x = (a; b), and dene
the set X as the product A  B. The classication of a school variable as an
administration or background variable is simple in theory. Endogenous variables
that can be inuenced by a school are attributed to administration; for exam-
ple, the number of instruction hours, the level of remediation per pupil, and
teacher motivation. Exogenous variables variables that cannot be changed
by a school, but whose distribution at school can possibly be altered by se-
lection mechanisms belong to background; think of initial test scores, innate
intelligence, and socioeconomic status of the pupils. Because most background
variables are directly related to characteristics of the pupils, we use the term
pupil background from now on.
The distinction between administration and background variables is less ev-
ident in empirical applications. Usually, the function f will be estimated via
a standard explanatory model of test scores; see, e.g., Hanushek (2006) for an
overview. A typical estimation includes observable characteristics, unobserved
pupil and school e¤ects, and idiosyncratic error terms. Each of these right-hand
side variables, observed and unobserved, must be classied as an administration
or a background variable.2 We will make a specic proposal in the next (empir-
ical) section, but for the theoretical analysis it is su¢ cient to assume that some
classication is made.3
2See Lefranc et al. (2009) for an alternative approach in which luck is not classied as
either responsibility or compensation, but treated as a separate category.
3We do not impose any restrictions on the function f . It is natural to dene the variables
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We do not explicitly model school behavior (as, e.g., in Barlevy and Neal,
2011). The output function f is a reduced form equation that reects the ed-
ucational production technology. We assume that f does not change under the
incentive scheme. Changes in subsidies can of course motivate schools to be
more e¤ective, otherwise the whole exercise would be meaningless. Changes
may also induce incentives for pupil selection. Both e¤ects are fully captured
in our framework by a change in the administration variables in a and pupil
background characteristics in b.
We use subscripts j = 1; 2; : : : ; J to denote schools. A school subsidy scheme
s : XJ ! RJ maps all information about the di¤erent schools x = (x1; x2; : : : ; xJ)
into a vector of school subsidies s(x) = (s1(x); s2(x); : : : ; sJ(x)). We look for a
subsidy scheme that rewards schools for better output without providing incen-
tives to attract or refer pupils with specic characteristics. What form should
s(x) take? To answer this question, we do not start from an overall social ob-
jective function, but we model the requirements to be imposed on the school
nancing scheme directly in terms of two basic principles. We rst formulate the
basic principles, then show that they are incompatible in general, and nally
introduce some possible compromise solutions.
This axiomatic approach (in terms of principles) is in line with the common
approach in the theory of fair allocation. First, one explicitly formulates basic
requirements to be imposed on a desirable allocation and afterwards one tries
to nd solutions that satisfy these requirements. This framework does not help
in evaluating formally the trade-o¤ between di¤erent principles, if they cannot
be satised at the same time. We do not extend the approach to arrive at a
complete social ordering of nancing schemes. This question is left for future
work. However, from an applied policy point of view, a less formal, but still
structured evaluation of the trade-o¤may have considerable advantages. In our
empirical work we will discuss the outcomes for di¤erent compromise solutions.
This can be seen as a sensitivity analysis, giving the decision-makers all the
results they need to take an informed decision.
a and b in such a way that they have a positive monotonic e¤ect on school output, but this is
not needed for our results.
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2.2 Getting the incentives right
We start with the reward principle. An increase in the output of a school that
is caused only by a change in administration should increase the school subsidy.
Let (a;b) denote the decomposition of x (with obvious notation).
incentives for good administration: For all x;x0 in XJ , for all j =
1; 2; : : : ; J , if ak = a0k for each school k 6= j, and b = b0, then sj(x0)  sj(x) if
and only if y0j  yj :
The axiom does not say that the subsidy increase should be su¢ ciently
large to make the cost (if any) of the change in administration worthwhile. It
simply says that good administration should be nancially encouraged. It can
be interpreted as a minimalist necessary condition for e¢ ciency.4
For later use, if the subsidy functions sj and the output function f are
di¤erentiable with respect to some administration variable ajk an element in
aj = (: : : ; ajk; : : :) then the axiom relates the marginal output to the marginal
subsidy, or
@sj(x)=@ajk  0 if and only if @f(xj)=@ajk  0, (1)
for all proles and schools.
We now turn to pupil selection. Changes in the background of pupils with-
out changes in administration e¢ ciency should not be rewarded in the funding
scheme. Otherwise schools would have an incentive to attract or refer pupils
with a specic background.
no incentives for pupil selection: For all x;x0 inXJ , for all j = 1; 2; : : : ; J ,
if a = a0, and bk = b0k for each school k 6= j, then sj(x0) = sj(x).
The principle clearly wipes out all nancial incentives for pupil selection. In
general such pupil selection is undesirable, as it may lead to unequal treatment of
pupils within schools, to segregation, and to restrictions on the freedom of choice
of pupils and parents. Note however that a normative trade-o¤ can arise if the
segregation or integration of pupils over schools would increase average school
output. Incentives for pupil selection could then be desirable from an e¢ ciency
point of view. We will come back to this issue when we discuss compromise
solutions that allow for pupil selection.
4Note that for the axiom to be meaningful, it is not necessary that increases in a have a
positive e¤ect on school output. If they have not, decreases in a will be rewarded.
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Given di¤erentiability with respect to a pupil background variable bjk an
element in bj = (: : : ; bjk; : : :) the axiom imposes no subsidy changes at the
margin, or
@sj(x)=@bjk = 0, (2)
for all proles and schools.
2.3 Performance incentives create selection incentives
The two principles seem minimal if the aim is to create incentives for good
administration and to avoid pupil selection at the same time. It is therefore
striking that it is not possible to design a funding scheme that satises both
principles in general, i.e., for all possible output functions f . As mentioned
before, this impossibility result is well known (in many variants) in the social
choice literature (Fleurbaey, 2008). Yet it remained largely unnoticed in the
literature on school accountability. Meyer (1997) is the only one, as far as
we know, that has drawn attention to the fact that schools cannot be ranked
unambiguously according to performance, if the e¤ect of background variables
on output di¤ers between them, but he did not integrate this observation in a
general theoretical framework.5
We provide a simple proof of the incompatibility between the two incentive
axioms. We focus on an arbitrary school, keeping information on all other
schools constant. We suppress subscripts, and, with a slight abuse of notation,
we denote the output and the subsidy of the school by f(a; b) and s(a; b). Let
b 2 B = R be an index of pupil background at the school. Figure 1 presents
school output as a function of pupil background for two types of administration
a and a0.
Figure 1
Start at situation 1 with administration a and pupil background b. An in-
crease in the background index from b to b0 leads us to situation 2. The axiom
no incentives for pupil selection requires the same subsidy in both situa-
tions, thus s(a; b) = s(a; b0). If the school would now change administration from
a to a0, ceteris paribus, then we go from situation 2 to 3 with a lower output.
5Moreover, Meyer (1997) claims that the empirical relevance of his observation is limited
because the assumption that slopes do not vary across schools is often a very reasonable
assumption. In the next section, we falsify this claim with Flemish data.
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The axiom incentives for good administration requires a lower subsidy
leading to s(a; b0) > s(a0; b0). If the school sticks to administration a0, but the
pupil background index changes back to b, then we arrive in situation 4. Again
the same subsidy should apply, so s(a0; b0) = s(a0; b). Finally, a change in ad-
ministration back to a, ceteris paribus, lowers output again, and the subsidy
must follow, or s(a0; b) > s(a; b). All things together we get a cycle. Proposition
1 summarizes this nding.
Proposition 1. There is no subsidy scheme that satises incentives for
good administration and no incentives for pupil selection in general,
i.e., for each possible output function f .
Proposition 1 has to be interpreted carefully: the general impossibility result
only holds if we look for a subsidy scheme satisfying both axioms for all possible
output functions f . It is obvious that the incompatibility disappears in Figure
1 if the lines would not intersect. Proposition 2 generalizes this observation (a
proof can be found in the appendix).
Proposition 2. A subsidy scheme can satisfy incentives for good admin-
istration and no incentives for pupil selection if and only if there exist
functions g : R  B ! R and h : A ! R, with g strictly increasing in its rst
argument, such that f(a; b) = g(h(a); b), for all x = (a; b) in X.
The intuition is easy. The separability condition in Proposition 2 allows to un-
ambiguously classify schools according to performance h(a): a higher value for
h(a) corresponds with a higher output, irrespective of the background of the
pupils. If we dene each subsidy sj(x) to be a strictly increasing function of the
school performance index h(aj), then both requirements will be satised by the
resulting subsidy scheme.
The actual relevancy of Propositions 1 and 2 is an empirical question. The
separability condition in Proposition 2 is implicitly imposed by the simple linear
models that are often used to estimate educational production functions. If this
linearity assumption holds, there is no conict between our two axioms, but
falsely assuming a linear form may have undesirable consequences in terms of
school administration and pupil selection. It is therefore important not to simply
assume separability, but to test whether it holds.
Proposition 2 gives a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the subsidy
scheme to satisfy both axioms if a and b can take any values in their respective
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domains A and B. In reality, the values taken by the observed administration
and background variables for a school fall in a more restricted range. So, even
if separability is rejected by the data, one cannot immediately draw the conclu-
sion that there is a conict over the restricted range. Accordingly, we will test
separability in section 3 in two ways. Applied to Figure 1, a rst test veries
whether both lines are parallel; if not, they must cross somewhere. A second
test looks whether the lines cross in the actual data range.
2.4 Compromise solutions
If there is a conict between the two principles, we have to formulate compromise
solutions. We can keep the incentives for good administration intact, but then
we may introduce incentives for selecting pupils with a certain background. Or
we can make sure that we avoid selection, but then the incentives to improve
pupil learning can be very di¤erent for di¤erent pupils and may even become
negative.
For ease of exposition, we suppress in our notation the dependency of the
subsidies on the prole x. We use linear subsidy schemes from now on and write
the per pupil subsidy for school j as
sj = constant + slope| {z }
>0
 eyj ; (3)
with eyj the (possibly corrected) output of school j that will be dened later on.
In this section we leave the choice of the constant and the slope open. One
option is to set the constant to satisfy the budget constraint of the regulator,
and the slope to guarantee a minimal subsidy to all schools. This is the ap-
proach that will be followed in the empirical application, but for the theoretical
analysis these choices are irrelevant.
Before we propose two families of compromise solutions, we discuss two
benchmark subsidy schemes: per capita (PC) and uncorrected output (UO)
funding. In many countries school funding is simply per capita, i.e.,
sPCj = constant. (4)
A per capita scheme does not provide any incentives, neither for good admin-
istration, nor for pupil selection. An uncorrected output scheme fully rewards
schools for output increases, without any correction for pupil background. The
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subsidy is equal to
sUOj = constant + slope  f(aj ; bj)| {z }
yj
: (5)
The scheme gives incentives for good administration, because changes in admin-
istration that lead to higher output clearly will be rewarded. Assuming di¤er-
entiability we obtain
@sUOj =@ajk = slope  @f(aj ; bj)=@ajk, (6)
and, given that slope > 0, condition (1) is indeed satised. For the same reason
however, also changes in background that lead to higher output will be rewarded.
Schools have an incentive to attract pupils with a background that is favorable
to output. Given di¤erentiability the subsidy change is equal to
@sUOj =@bjk = slope  @f(aj ; bj)=@bjk; (7)
violating condition (2) if @f(aj ; bj)=@bjk di¤ers from zero.
A rst family of compromise solutions is based on a reference administration
(RA) level, denoted ea, to correct output. Dene corrected output as eyj = yj  
f(ea; bj); the subsidy is then equal to
sRAj = constant + slope  ( f(aj ; bj)| {z }
yj
  f(ea; bj) ): (8)
Schools are rewarded if their output is higher than the hypothetical output
that would result if the school had chosen the reference administration level,
ceteris paribus. The scheme creates incentives for good administration, because
changes in administration that are favorable to output translate into higher
subsidies. Assuming di¤erentiability of the reference scheme, the incentive for
good administration @sRAj =@ajk is exactly equal to the one for uncorrected out-
put in equation (6). Reference administration schemes may lead to selection
incentives, however. The selection incentive depends on
@sRAj =@bjk = slope  (@f(aj ; bj)=@bjk   @f(ea; bj)=@bjk); (9)
and will typically be di¤erent from zero, thus violating (2). Comparing (7) and
(9), if the derivatives @f(aj ; bj)=@bjk and @f(ea; bj)=@bjk are similar in sign and
magnitude, then j@sRAj =@bjkj will be smaller than j@sUOj =@bjkj. Summing up,
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reference administration schemes provide similar incentives for good adminis-
tration compared to uncorrected output schemes, but are likely to provide lower
incentives for pupil selection.
The mirror image of the previous scheme is to choose a reference pupil back-
ground (RB), say eb. If we dene corrected output as eyj = f(aj ;eb), then schools
will be rewarded on the basis of the hypothetical output that would arise if
its actual administration were applied to the reference pupil population. This
yields
sRBj = constant + slope  f(aj ;eb): (10)
The subsidy sRBj does not depend on the school background bj anymore, which
removes selection incentives. With di¤erentiability, we indeed get @sRBj =@bjk =
0 as required by (2). But actual output does not appear in equation (10) either.
We can immediately derive that
@sRBj =@ajk = slope  @f(aj ;eb)=@ajk; (11)
and condition (1) is no longer satised if the change in the true output, being
@f(aj ; bj)=@ajk, has a di¤erent sign compared to the change in the hypothetical
output @f(aj ;eb)=@ajk. Because we expect that the signs of both derivatives
often coincide, the reference background scheme will provide more incentives for
good administration compared to a per capita scheme. Summing up, reference
background schemes provide no incentives for pupil selection, as is the case in
a per capita scheme, but in addition they can be expected to provide some
incentives for good administration.
Table 1 summarizes the di¤erent schemes and their properties, i.e., is the
axiom satised, how large do we expect the incentives to be, and for how many
schools will the axioms be satised? Per capita schemes do not give incen-
tives for good administration nor incentives for pupil selection to any school.
Uncorrected output schemes give both incentives to all schools. We expect the
reference schemes to do better. More precisely, reference administration schemes
outperform the uncorrected output schemes, because they give the same incen-
tives for good administration to all schools, but with less incentives for pupil
selection. Reference background schemes outperform per capita schemes, be-
cause they provide no incentives for pupil selection, but more incentives for
good administration.
Table 1
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While we expect reference administration and reference background schemes
to be better than the simple benchmark schemes, they also require more infor-
mation. More importantly, the extra information required by the schemes in
equation (8) and (10) is also di¤erent. To implement these schemes, the reg-
ulator must have (an estimate of) the educational production function f . In
addition, a reference administration scheme requires information about output
yj and background variables bj , while a reference background scheme needs in-
formation about the administration variables aj . These di¤erent requirements
may have practical consequences. A reference background scheme o¤ers scope
for strategic behavior, e.g., increasing instruction time without any real results.
Even worse, it may create incentives for misreporting variables, like instruction
time, that are di¢ cult to verify. Strategic behavior is less problematic in a ref-
erence administration scheme. Test scores are collected in a standardized way
and background variables typically consist of pupil characteristics that can more
easily be controlled by the regulator.
A nal note. The reference administration and reference background schemes
are familiesof solutions, since we obtain one scheme for each specic choice
of reference. The implications that have been described in this section hold for
the complete family, but this does not mean that the choice of reference values
is irrelevant. We will return to this issue in the next section.
3 Empirical illustration
We use data collected by the SiBO-project in Flanders, the northern part of
Belgium. The aim of the project is to describe and explain di¤erences in the
primary school curriculum of Flemish pupils. At the time of the survey, there
were no school accountability schemes in Flanders that could create nancial
incentives for pupil selection by schools. However, parents are free to choose
a school and schools care for their reputation. There are basically two school
groups in Flanders: a group of public schools and a group of private, mainly
catholic schools. Certainly for primary schools, the two groups are competing
for pupils at the local level. Contrary to the situation in most other countries,
public and private schools are both publicly nanced and the di¤erence between
them is mainly ideological. There is evidence of sorting, as catholic schools
attract more pupils with a favorable background. We will come back to that
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issue in our empirical work. Schools in the Flemish system have a reasonable
amount of autonomy to decide about their own practical organization.
In the SiBO-project, pupils were tested in mathematics at the start of the
rst grade (in September-October 2003 when (most) pupils were 6 years old)
and at the end of grades 1 and 2 (in May-June of 2004 and 2005).6 We have
7591 pupil-time observations distributed over 125 schools. A subgroup of 3314
pupils are tested in both periods, 533 pupils in period 1 only, and 430 in period
2 only. The dynamics of attrition and replenishment are summarized in Figure
2. The main reason for attrition and replenishment is student retainment. We
will test for this potential source of selection bias.
Figure 2
Our pupil data include the gender of the pupil, the language they speak with
each of the parents, and the education level of the parents.7 Classroom data
consist of the total experience of the teacher, the class size, the instruction time
for mathematics, and the number of teachers in a class (either one full time
or two halftime teachers). We also include the average initial test score of the
peers, dened as all other pupils in the same class. For estimation purposes we
restrict the sample to pupils with non-missing initial test scores and classroom
data, that go to schools with at least 10 pupils tested in each grade.8 We are left
with 5817 pupil-time observations 2239 pupils appearing in both grades, 628
in grade 1 only, and 711 in grade 2 only distributed over 111 schools. Table 2
describes all variables and Tables 3a and 3b provide summary statistics.
Table 2, 3a, and 3b
3.1 Explaining test scores: a linear exploration of the data
Let yijt be the (standardized) math test score of pupil i at school j at time t
and let zijt be the vector of observable regressors. To explore the data, we start
with a standard linear panel model, i.e.,
yijt = 
0zijt + ui + vj + wijt; (12)
6The math tests consists of between 40 and 80 questions (depending on the grade). The
score distributions are well-behaved, showing no oor and only limited ceiling e¤ects.
7Note that Dutch is the o¢ cial language in Flanders.
8To limit the reduction in sample size, we add a dummy missingin case of missing pupil
level data (except for initial test scores). We will not report the corresponding estimates which
are, as expected, never signicant.
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with ui a randompupil e¤ect, vj a xedschool e¤ect, and wijt an idiosyncratic
error term. Following Mundlak (1978), we always add group means averages
of the time-varying covariates at the pupil level to the specication. Standard
errors are adjusted for clustering at the school level.
Table 4
Table 4 reports estimates of the parameters in equation (12). The initial
test score plays an important role in all models. Its coe¢ cient is rather robust
and smaller than 1, indicating that the gain in test scores, is larger for pupils
with a lower initial test score. The background variables play a more modest
role and their e¤ects depend on whether or not the initial test score is taken up
as a covariate.
In model (b) without initial test scores, boys do better than girls. Having
Dutch-speaking and more educated parents improve test scores and these e¤ects
are stronger and more signicant for mothers compared to fathers.
In model (c) with initial test scores as an additional regressor, some of the
estimated coe¢ cients for the background variables change in magnitude and
even in sign. We provide two striking examples. First, speaking Dutch with
your parents has a negative coe¢ cient once we correct for initial test scores.
Indeed, pupils that do not speak Dutch at home have a worse preparation on
average before starting primary education. Therefore their initial test score un-
derestimates their potential, leading to a catching-up e¤ect in the rst grades.
Second, the e¤ect of fatherseducation level is now stronger than that of moth-
ers. This is consistent with the hypothesis that mothers have a larger e¤ect on
initial test scores during the pre-primary education period, while fathers have a
larger e¤ect on the primary education growth of their children.
Comparing models (c) and (d) shows that adding class level variables has
a minor e¤ect on the estimated coe¢ cients for the background variables. In
model (d), all class variables, except class size, have the expected sign, but none
of the class variables is statistically signicant.
3.2 Selection and sorting
The estimation procedure leading to the estimates in Table 4 neglects the issue
of sorting and sample selection. The rst column in Table 5 reproduces the
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estimates of model (d) reported in Table 4. Model (e) and model (f) in Table 5
correct for attrition/replenishment and for sorting respectively.
Table 5
The rst issue relates to the attrition and replenishment in the SiBO-data.
The results of a variable addition test (see, Verbeek and Nijman, 1992, and
Wooldridge, 1995) indicate that missingness might be informative, especially
for attrition.9 To check whether selection inuences the estimation results, we
estimate a selection equation in each period and add the generalized residuals
to the output equation. To improve identication, we include regional dummies
in the selection equation. Following Semykina and Wooldridge (2010), we allow
the correlation between the unobserved pupil e¤ects of the selection and the
output equation to vary over time. In contrast to the variable addition test, the
generalized residuals and time interactions together are not signicant (2(4) =
2:10 with prob > 2 equal to 0:72).
A second issue relates to the possibility of sorting. As described before,
although there are no nancial incentives to do so, the evidence suggests that
private, mainly catholic schools, attract pupils with a stronger socioeconomic
background. To check whether this sorting inuences the estimation results we
follow the same procedure as before. We estimate a selection equation (based
on being in a catholic school or not) in each period and add the generalized
residuals (with time interactions) and the catholic school dummy to the output
equation.10 Given that competition for pupils occurs at the local level and that
school choice is mainly on ideological grounds, we include again the regional
dummies in the selection equation together with religion dummies (catholic,
protestant, jewish, islam, freemason, areligious) for both parents. The catholic
school dummy in the output equation is positive, but not statistically signi-
cant. Interestingly, note that the coe¢ cient for class size becomes negative, but
remains statistically insignicant.11 The generalized residuals and time inter-
9The coe¢ cient on a dummy present in the rst periodis 0.036 (s.e. 0.056) and hence is
not signicantly di¤erent from zero. The dummy present in the second periodgets a highly
signicant estimated coe¢ cient of 0.291 (s.e. 0.048). A 2-test for joint signicance of the
two dummies yields 2(2) = 39:67 (p = 0:00).
10The e¤ect of being in a catholic school cannot be estimated with a full set of school
dummies included. We therefore omit the school dummies in model (f).
11 Including a quadratic term for class size reveals that class size has a negative e¤ect up to
a class size of (slightly more than) 23 pupils, covering almost 80% of all pupils in the sample.
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actions together are also not signicant (2(4) = 4:07 with prob > 2 equal to
0:40).
3.3 Testing separability
A linear specication, like equation (12), is common in the literature on educa-
tional production functions. It satises the separability condition of Proposition
2, irrespective of how the right-hand variables are classied into administration
and background variables. For the derivation of a nancing scheme however, it
is essential to test explicitly whether the separability condition holds.
To do so, we split the observables zijt into administration and background
variables, denoted za;ijt and zb;ijt. It is natural to assign variables at the class
and school level including the school-specic constant, but excluding the peer
variable to administration. All other variables the pupil-level variables, the
time dummy, and the peer variable are classied as background. To test sep-
arability we generalize (12), allowing the pupil background coe¢ cients to vary
over schools, i.e.,
yijt = 
0
aza;ijt + 
0
b;jzb;ijt + ui + vj + wijt; (13)
The specication with variable slope coe¢ cients b;j for each background
variable is very exible. Following Arcidiacono and Koedel (2014), a consider-
able simplication could be obtained by introducing an academic index for each
pupil, say,
Iijt = 
0zb;ijt; (14)
and rewriting equation (13) as
yijt = 
0
aza;ijt + jIijt + ui + vj + wijt: (15)
The estimated coe¢ cients b for the academic index (14) are given in Table 6 and
look reasonable.12 However, the coe¢ cient restrictions imposed by equations
(14) and (15) are strongly rejected by a likelihood ratio test (2(784) = 1650:96
with p = 0:000). We therefore stick to the more general specication (13).
The estimated coe¢ cients are -0.0394622 for class size and 0.0008517 for squared class size,
but both together are not signicant (2(2) = 0:33 with prob > 2 equal to 0:85).
12Note that they are normalized so that the coe¢ cient for girlgets the value -1. Absolute
numbers are therefore not directly comparable to the estimates in Table 4, but the ratios
between the coe¢ cients are.
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Table 6
To see why equation (13) is not separable, suppose school output is equal
to the expected average pupil output. Let a bar denote an average (with the
subscript indicating at which level the average is taken) and let a hat indicate
an estimate; school output is equal to
yj =
b0aza;j + b0b;jzb;j + bvj ; (16)
where yj is the average test score in school j. Since the slope coe¢ cients bb;j
tell us how pupils with a certain background perform at school j, it is natural
to assign these coe¢ cients to administration.13 We get:
yj =
b0aza;j + bvj| {z } + b0b;jzb;j| {z } :
pure administration mixture
The non-linear terms in b0b;jzb;j mix administration and background. They
are crucial to test the separability condition in proposition 2. More precisely,
separability is satised if the slope coe¢ cients bb;j are the same for all schools.
Table 7 summarizes the separability tests based on model (13). The equal
slope-hypothesis is statistically rejected, for each background variable sepa-
rately as well as for all background variables jointly.
Table 7
Two remarks. First, as discussed in the previous section, it is possible that
the former test rejects separability, but that there is no incompatibility between
the two principles of incentives for good administration and no incen-
tives for pupil selection within the range of actual observations. One could
argue that in the latter case there is not really a problem, at least in the short
and medium term. We therefore also check if the educational production func-
tions for the schools in our sample signicantly cross each other. We test this
with respect to initial test scores. We rst check, for each school, if its produc-
tion function crosses the production function of another school in their common
data range. If a crossing is present, we test if the slopes for the two schools are
13To avoid confusion, we stress that the subscript b in the estimated slope vector bb;j
indicates that it is a slope vector for the background variables. Still, these background slopes
are at the school level and therefore classied as administration variables.
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signicantly di¤erent. It turns out that for each school in our sample, except
one, there is another school such that their production functions signicantly
cross. We conclude that the conict between the two principles, as described in
Figure 1, is empirically relevant in our sample.
Second, the performed separability test assumes a linear production function.
If the linearity assumption is not true, di¤erent slopes for di¤erent schools would
not necessarily mean that the production functions cross, but only that they are
measured at di¤erent points of, e.g., a concave production function. We therefore
repeat the separability test with a quadratic term for initial test scores. This
analysis conrms that nal test scores are indeed a concave function of initial
test scores, but separability is again rejected.14
Because separability does not hold, incentives for good administration may
create incentives for pupil selection and, vice-versa, removing incentives for pupil
selection may create incentives for bad administration. We now turn to the prac-
tical relevance of the incompatibility. In particular, we will check to what extent
the di¤erent subsidy schemes dened above satisfy the principles of incentives
for good administration and no incentives for pupil selection and
we look for the most attractive compromise solution.
3.4 The trade-o¤ in practice
Recall the linear subsidy scheme dened in equation (3). Let us rst opera-
tionalize its di¤erent interpretations within the context of the non-separable
model (13). For this empirical application we have to specify the constant and
the slope. The constant can be xed by introducing the budget constraint faced
by the regulator, i.e., by imposing that the average subsidy per pupil has to be
equal to the available budget per pupil. If we normalize the available budget to
be 1 unit per pupil, the per-pupil subsidy at school j becomes
sj = 1 + slope  ( eyj   ey );
with ey the average (corrected) output.15
To x the slope, a natural constraint is to guarantee each school a minimal
subsidy per pupil, say s, with 0 < s < 1. A minimal subsidy requirement imposes
14The separability test statistic is 2(220) = 558:38 with prob > 2 equal to 0.000.
15Remember that if we dene an average without a subscript, this is the average over the
whole population, i.e. over all schools.
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an upper bound on the slope:
slope  ( 1  s ) = ( ey  min eyj ): (17)
With s xed, equation (17) will yield a di¤erent upper bound for slope, de-
pending on the subsidy scheme used. To ease the comparison of the results for
the di¤erent schemes, we choose slope to be equal to the lowest upper bound
over the di¤erent schemes. Taking s = 0:5, we get a coe¢ cient slope ( 0:4)
that is common to all schemes, but the minimal subsidy per pupil will di¤er
slightly between the di¤erent schemes.
We can now provide a formula for each subsidy scheme. Denoting as before
the reference levels by a tilde, we get (the derivations can be found in the
appendix):
sPCj = 1;
sUOj = 1 + slope (yj   y);
sRAj = 1 + slope f(yj   y)  e0b(zb;j   zb)g;
sRBj = 1 + slope f(yj   y)  b0b;j(zb;j   ezb) + b0b;j(zb;j   ezb)g:
As noted before, the reference levels in reference administration and reference
background models can be chosen. These choices will have di¤erent implications
for incentives. In the empirical illustration, the reference levels for slopes eb and
averages ezb are based on the distribution of the estimated coe¢ cients bb;j and
the averages zb;j over the di¤erent schools. We choose the 5th percentile (low),
the median (mid), and the 95th percentile (high).
It is instructive to compare these solutions with what could be described as
the common practice of using a value added (V A) model. If one sticks to the
(rejected) separable model
yijt = 
V A0
a za;ijt + 
V A0
b zb;ijt + u
V A
i + v
V A
j + w
V A
ijt , (18)
then school output is predicted as
yj =
bV A0a za;j + bV A0b zb;j + bvV Aj :
The part bV A0a za;j + bvV Aj is usually considered to be the value-added of the
school; see, e.g., Meyer (1997). If we dene corrected output eyj as value added,
the per pupil subsidy reduces to (see appendix)
sV Aj = 1 + slope f(yj   y)  bV A0b (zb;j   zb)g:
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Comparing this value-added scheme with the reference administration subsidy
scheme shows immediately that the former is a special case of the latter if one
sets the reference coe¢ cients eb equal to the coe¢ cients bV Ab estimated with
the wrongly specied model (18). Since bV Ab will not be very di¤erent from
the median value for bb;j , the value-added scheme will have similar properties
as the corresponding (median) reference administration scheme. It will create
incentives for e¢ ciency, but also incentives for pupil selection.
To check the extent to which these schemes satisfy the two basic principles
in practice, we perform some simulations. These simulations are based on the
estimates of model (d) in Table 5 and thus ignore selection bias (model (e))
and sorting bias (model (f)). Recall that the generalized residuals where not
statistically signicant either in model (e) or in model (f), so we could not reject
the hypothesis of no selection and no sorting. More important for our purposes,
the estimates in models (e) and (f) are close to the ones in model (d) and lead
therefore to similar simulation results.
Because the results in Table 4 indicate that initial test scores and parental
education correlate strongly with nal test scores, we select these two variables
for further analysis. The distribution of their slopes and averages over schools
is given in Table 8.16 The simulation results are given in Tables 9 and 10
respectively. Because the simulation results for initial test scores and parental
education are very similar, we only discuss those for initial test scores, reported
in Table 9.
Tables 8, 9, and 10
A rst simulation focuses on the subsidy change that might result from
changing the administration of a school without changing the school output.
This can be realized by increasing the slope of the background variable bb;j
by one standard deviation and simultaneously decreasing the school xed e¤ectbvj such that yj = bb;jzb;j + bvj = 0 holds. Applied to initial test scores,
one could interpret this simulation as reecting a more elitist school policy
that shifts teaching e¤ort from low to high (initial) achievers, without changing
school output. The reverse, more egalitarian policy of decreasing the slope and
simultaneously increasing the xed e¤ect can also be simulated. The results are
identical in absolute value, but have an opposite sign.
16The reported slopes for average initial test scores include the peer e¤ect. For parental
education we include both the education of the mother and of the father.
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Because the output e¤ect is zero by construction, incentives for good
administration requires that this policy should not lead to an increase in the
school subsidy. Table 9a shows the e¤ect of the elitist policy on the school
subsidies per pupil for the di¤erent subsidy schemes. To interpret the numbers,
recall that the subsidies are normalized to be 1 on average. So, -0.08 or 0.06
can be interpreted as a loss or a gain equal to 8% or 6% of the average school
subsidy.17 All subsidy changes should be interpreted as short-term changes, i.e.,
assuming that other schools do not change policy.
Table 9a shows that the reference administration (RA) schemes including
the value added (V A) scheme and the uncorrected output (UO) scheme satisfy
the reward principle. If output does not change, the subsidy does not change.
However, this is not true for the reference background (RB) schemes. The sub-
sidy change depends on the choice of the reference value and can be negative or
positive. If one chooses a low value for the reference ez, Table 9a shows that 96%
of the schools would receive less subsidies if they choose a more elitist policy.
Because the egalitarian scheme has exactly the opposite consequences, 96% of
the schools have therefore an incentive to choose more egalitarian policies in
case of a low reference. If one chooses a high value for the reference, about 94%
of the schools have an incentive to choose more elitist policies.
The problem of the RB schemes is in fact more severe. Recall that the reg-
ulator can only apply these RB schemes if she gets the necessary information
about the administration variables from the schools themselves. This informa-
tion is di¢ cult to verify and easy to manipulate. It is therefore clear that there
is a real danger that the RB schemes are manipulated by the schools to receive
a higher subsidy without a better performance.
A second simulation looks at the subsidy change resulting from a change in
the pupil distribution of a school. We implement this hypothetical change by
simulating the e¤ect of increasing zb;j by one standard deviation.18 Applied
to initial test scores, the policy can be interpreted as attracting better pupils.
Ideally, no incentives for pupil selection requires that the subsidy should
not change, since schools should not be rewarded for pupil selection if there is
no increase in administration e¢ ciency.
17We do not report the results for the per-capita scheme, because per-capita subsidies
obviously do not respond to the simulated changes.
18Again, the subsidy changes of decreasing, rather than increasing the average background
characteristics are exactly the same, up to a minus sign.
21
The change in subsidies for a change in initial test scores are given in Table
9b. With the reference background schemes, schools are not rewarded when
changing their pupil composition (without changing their administration e¢ -
ciency). However, the reference administration schemes and the uncorrected
output scheme provide incentives for pupil selection. In case of uncorrected
output for example, increasing the average initial test scores at school by one
standard deviation may increase the subsidy up to 18% of the average school
subsidy. The gains and losses in case of the reference administration schemes
are typically smaller and depend on the reference slope. If the RA scheme is
implemented with a low reference value for the pupil background, almost all
schools gain by attracting pupils with higher initial test scores. Choosing a high
reference value implies that most schools would loose when attracting pupils
with higher initial test scores, or symmetrically, that most schools would gain
by attracting pupils with lower initial test scores.
The tables suggest that choosing a median reference level minimizes the
absolute magnitude of the selection incentives. Since this is very close to the
value added (V A) model, the latter also performs satisfactorily in this respect.
Moreover, the reference level will play a role for behavior and can now be used to
steer selection incentives. A low reference implies that most schools benet from
attracting stronger pupils, while a high reference implies that most schools gain
from attracting weaker pupils. An intermediate level as in the value added
model imply that some schools gain and other schools lose from attracting
better students. Interestingly, this may lead to e¢ cient sorting. Schools with a
higher slope than the reference slope perform better for stronger pupils and also
have an incentive to attract the stronger pupils and refer the weaker ones; and
schools with a lower slope than the reference slope perform better for weaker
pupils and also get an incentive to attract them and to refer better pupils. Of
course, stronger segregation of pupils will result. The simulation results illustrate
clearly the trade-o¤ between di¤erent objectives that was already mentioned
when we introduced the principle of no incentives for pupil selection.
4 Conclusion
Recent experiences have shown that introducing school accountability may cre-
ate incentives for e¢ ciency. It may also have undesirable side-e¤ects, however,
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like pupil selection, even if test scores can be perfectly corrected for pupil char-
acteristics. We have shown that a school nancing scheme that rewards output
also creates incentives for cream-skimming, unless the educational production
function satises an (unrealistic) separability assumption. It is therefore neces-
sary to consider explicitly the trade-o¤ between the two objectives of improving
performance and avoiding selection. We discuss the pros and cons of di¤erent
compromise solutions and we have shown how information from the empirical
educational production literature can be integrated in a coherent normative
framework. This normative framework illustrates how the theory of fair alloca-
tion can also be applied to the design of nancing schemes for institutions.
The empirical relevance of this analysis is illustrated with data on Flemish
primary schools, for which the conict between rewarding output and removing
incentives for cream-skimming is shown to be empirically relevant. Given the
manipulability of schemes that rely on information about the policy decisions of
schools, one could argue in favor of what we have called reference administra-
tionschemes. To implement such schemes the regulator only needs information
on the characteristics of the pupils. Our empirical results illustrate the impor-
tance of choosing a correct reference value for the administration variable.
Choosing a low (high) reference value for the slope variable creates incentives
for better treatment and selection of pupils with higher (lower) initial test scores
and parental education. Picking an intermediate value (as is implicitly done by
the value added model) will minimize the selection incentives and may even in-
duce a kind of e¢ cient sorting. In this empirical setting the value added-model
therefore comes out as a reasonable compromise.
We have interpreted our axioms and results in terms of a funding scheme.
This is not the only possible interpretation, however. One could as well argue
that s(x) represents only a performance measure, rather than a subsidy. Our
principles remain valid in this measurement interpretation incentives for
good administration could be rebaptized as performance sensitivity and
no incentives for pupil selection as correction for pupil characteristics
and the impossibility result remains relevant in this setting. Even if the regula-
tor is not willing to introduce accountability in the system (which may be the
case in many European countries) and sticks to the idea of quality norms and
control, the framework remains valid. It is natural to nancially compensate
schools with a socially disadvantaged pupil population, as it is more di¢ cult for
23
them to realize the required quality norms. In general however, it is not pos-
sible to compensate schools for their pupil population, while leaving the school
autonomy to meet the quality criteria una¤ected. The current framework can
therefore shed a light on this question as well.
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Proof of proposition 2
A subsidy scheme can satisfy incentives for good administration and
no incentives for pupil selection if and only if there exist functions g :
RB ! R and h : A! R, with g strictly increasing in its rst argument, such
that f(a; b) = g(h(a); b), for all x = (a; b) in X.
If the separability condition holds, it is possible to dene a subsidy scheme s
such that each school subsidy sj is a strictly increasing function of h (aj) only.
Such a scheme satises both axioms. We show the opposite.
Consider a subsidy scheme that satises incentives for good admin-
istration and no incentives for pupil selection. We show that, for
arbitrary administrations a; a0 2 A and backgrounds b; b0 2 B, we have
f(a; b)  f(a0; b), f(a; b0)  f(a0; b0): (19)
This would indeed allow to properly dene functions
1. h : A! R with h(a)  h(a0) if f (a; b)  f (a0; b) for some b 2 B, and
2. g : RB ! R with g(h(a); b) = f(a; b) for all x = (a; b),
with g strictly increasing in its rst argument.
We proceed by contradiction. Suppose equation (19) does not hold, e.g.,
both f (a; b)  f (a0; b) and f (a; b0) < f (a0; b0) are true for some a; a0 2 A and
b; b0 2 B. (It is easy to verify the other direction using the same logic.) We can
use these a; a0 2 A and b; b0 2 B to construct four states (a; b), (a0; b), (a; b0),
and (a0; b0) for some school (tacitly assuming that school information remains
constant for all other schools). We suppress subscripts and use f(a; b) and (with
slight abuse of notation) s(a; b) to refer to the output and the subsidy of the
school under consideration. Applying incentives for good administration
twice, we must have
s(a; b)  s(a0; b)  0 and s(a; b0)  s(a0; b0) < 0: (20)
Applying no incentives for pupil selection twice, we obtain
s(a; b) = s(a; b0) and s(a0; b) = s(a0; b0),
and, subtracting both equations, we get:
s(a; b)  s(a0; b) = s(a; b0)  s(a0; b0): (21)
Equation (20) and (21) are incompatible, a contradiction.
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A derivation of the empirical subsidy schemes
The per-capita and uncorrected output schemes are straightforward. We discuss
the reference administration, reference background and value added scheme. A
subsidy scheme is dened as
sj = 1 + slope  (eyj   ey);
with the slope dened by (17) for each scheme. We focus here on the di¤erenceeyj   ey.
We start from the empirical model
yj =
b0aza;j + bvj + b0b;jzb;j = f( za;j ; bvj ; b0b;j| {z } ; zb;j| {z } );
= f( aj ; bj ):
The RA models use a reference administration, say ea = (eza; ev; eb), to dene the
hypothetical output as
eyj = yj   f (ea; bj) = yj   (0aeza + ev + e0bzb;j):
The average hypothetical output is equal to
ey = y   (0aeza + ev + e0bzb);
and the di¤erence eyj   ey is indeed equal to
(yj   y)  e0b(zb;j   zb):
Starting from the same empirical model, the RB models replace zb;j by a
reference background eb = ezb to get
eyj = f(aj ;eb) = b0aza;j + bvj + b0b;jezb:
The OLS estimate for bvj is
bvj = yj   b0aza;j   b0b;jzb;j ;
and we can rewrite the hypothetical output as
eyj = yj   b0b;j(zb;j   ezb):
The average is given by
eyj = y   b0b;j(zb;j   ezb);
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and the di¤erence eyj   eyj indeed becomes
(yj   y)  b0b;j(zb;j   ezb) + b0b;j(zb;j   ezb):
Finally, for the value-added (VA) model we have
eyj = bV A0a za;j + bvV Aj ;
with the OLS estimate of vV Aj in (18) given by
bvV Aj = yj   bV A0a za;j   bV A0b zb;j :
Plugging in the OLS estimate, corrected output becomes
eyj = yj   bV A0b zb;j :
Averaging the corrected output, we get
ey = y   bV A0b zb;
and the di¤erence eyj   ey indeed reduces to
(yj   y)  bV A0b (zb;j   zb):
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Figure 1. Aligning performance and selection incentives: mission impossible
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Table 3a. Summary statistics for pupil variables.
math score mean std.dev. p10 median p90
grade 1 8.75 1.00 7.44 8.77 10.06
grade 2 9.71 1.00 8.43 9.71 11.04
initial math score mean std.dev. p10 median p90
grade 1 8.05 1.02 6.71 8.13 9.31
grade 2 8.16 0.97 6.85 8.22 9.37
sex = boy = girl
grade 1 50.54% 49.46%
grade 2 50.58% 49.15%
language mother = dutch 6= dutch miss.
grade 1 86.82% 8.61% 4.57%
grade 2 85.69% 9.12% 5.19%
language father = dutch 6= dutch miss.
grade 1 84.80% 10.29% 4.91%
grade 2 84.54% 9.90% 5.56%
mothers highest
degree
< 2ary 2ary 3ary
( 6=univ.)
3ary
(=univ.)
miss.
grade 1 19.25% 33.94% 29.06% 8.72% 9.03%
grade 2 16.54% 33.56% 30.41% 10.00% 9.49%
fathers highest
degree
<2ary 2ary 3ary
( 6=univ.)
3ary
(=univ.)
miss.
grade 1 19.29% 34.74% 21.00% 12.07% 12.90%
grade 2 17.49% 34.78% 22.10% 13.39% 12.24%
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Table 3b. Summary statistics for class variables
# of teachers = 1 = 2
grade 1 89.33% 10.67%
grade 2 86.27% 13.73%
instruction time mean std.dev. p10 median p90
grade 1 6.17 0.86 5 6 7
grade 2 6.30 0.87 5.5 6 7
total experience mean std.dev. p10 median p90
grade 1 15.15 8.95 4 15 28
grade 2 17.67 9.37 4 18 30
class size mean std.dev. p10 median p90
grade 1 20.12 3.80 15 20 26
grade 2 20.24 4.08 15 20 26
peer e¤ect mean std.dev. p10 median p90
grade 1 8.05 0.47 7.48 8.13 8.55
grade 2 8.16 0.48 7.62 8.27 8.64
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Table 4. Explaining math test scores
math model a model b model c model d
coe¤. p>jtj coe¤. p>jtj coe¤. p>jtj coe¤. p>jtj
math0 0.67 0.00 0.64 0.00 0.64 0.00
girl -0.26 0.00 -0.24 0.00 -0.24 0.00
m_dutch 0.16 0.01 -0.13 0.01 -0.13 0.02
f_dutch 0.09 0.13 -0.07 0.20 -0.06 0.22
m_edu_sec 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.95 0.00 0.96
m_edu_high 0.45 0.00 0.10 0.01 0.10 0.01
m_edu_uni 0.52 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.19 0.00
f_edu_sec 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07
f_edu_high 0.25 0.05 0.14 0.00 0.13 0.00
f_edu_uni 0.38 0.06 0.24 0.00 0.23 0.00
duo -0.10 0.26
peer 0.13 0.29
time_math 0.09 0.10
experience 0.00 0.47
class_size 0.01 0.30
R2 0.61 0.41 0.64 0.64
# observations 5817 5817 5817 5817
constant, time dummy, school dummies, and group means included, but not reported
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Table 5. Robustness for sample selection and sorting
math model d model e model f
coe¤. p>jtj coe¤. p>jtj coe¤. p>jtj
math0 0.64 0.00 0.63 0.00 0.64 0.00
girl -0.24 0.00 -0.25 0.00 -0.24 0.00
m_dutch -0.13 0.02 -0.13 0.06 -0.13 0.04
f_dutch -0.06 0.22 -0.07 0.21 -0.03 0.58
m_edu_sec 0.00 0.96 -0.01 0.78 0.02 0.66
m_edu_high 0.10 0.01 0.09 0.04 0.12 0.01
m_edu_uni 0.19 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.20 0.01
f_edu_sec 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.11
f_edu_high 0.13 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.14 0.00
f_edu_uni 0.23 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.24 0.00
duo -0.10 0.26 -0.07 0.55 -0.14 0.10
peer 0.13 0.29 0.10 0.43 0.09 0.53
time_math 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.20 0.10 0.05
experience 0.00 0.47 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.48
class_size 0.01 0.30 0.01 0.29 -0.01 0.58
gr1 -0.13 0.30 -0.02 0.83
gr1time2 -0.08 0.14 0.08 0.43
gr2 -0.14 0.24 -0.02 0.69
gr2time2 0.09 0.56 -0.03 0.80
catholic 0.11 0.29
R2 0.64 0.64 0.60
# observations 5817 5817 4457
constant, time dummy, school dummies (except f), and group means included, but not
reported.
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Table 6. An academic index
math index
coe¤. p>jtj
girly -1.00
m_dutch -0.19 0.00
f_dutch -0.36 0.00
m_edu_sec -0.01 0.88
m_edu_high 0.49 0.00
m_edu_uni 1.03 0.00
f_edu_sec 0.12 0.13
f_edu_high 0.36 0.00
f_edu_uni 0.57 0.00
yEstimate for girl is normalized to -1
39
Table 7. Educational production is not likely to be separable
2-value df Prob > 2
initial test score 298.11 110 0.00
girl 259.67 110 0.00
mother dutch 554.76 110 0.00
father dutch 496.68 110 0.00
education mother 1428.04 305 0.00
education father 1222.27 305 0.00
all variables 1.71010 964 0.00
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Table 9. Incentives with respect to initial test scores
Table 9a. Incentives for good administration when changing the initial test score slope
change: increase slope (+1) without change in output
ideally: sj should be zero for all schools
p05 p25 p50 p75 p95 %<0 %>0
ref. administration (RA) zero for all schools zero %
value added (VA) zero for all schools zero %
low ez -0.08 -0.07 -0.05 -0.04 0.00 96% 4%
ref. background (RB) mid ez -0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.02 0.05 51% 49%
high ez 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.08 6% 94%
uncorrected output (UO) zero for all schools zero %
Table 9b. Incentives for pupil selection when changing the initial test score distribution
change: attract pupils with a higher initial test scores (+1)
ideally: sj should be zero for all schools
p05 p25 p50 p75 p95 %<0 %>0
low e 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.08 6% 94%
ref. administration (RA) mid e -0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.02 0.04 51% 49%
high e -0.08 -0.06 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 97% 3%
value added (VA) -0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.02 0.04 48% 52%
ref. background (RB) zero for all schools zero %
uncorrected output (UO) 0.10 0.11 0.14 0.16 0.18 0% 100%
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Table 10. Incentives with respect to parental education
Table 10a. Incentives for good administration when changing the parental education slope
change: increase slope (+1) without change in output
ideally: sj should be zero for all schools
p05 p25 p50 p75 p95 %<0 %>0
ref. administration (RA) zero for all schools zero %
value added (VA) zero for all schools zero %
low ez -0.08 -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 100% 0%
ref. background (RB) mid ez -0.05 -0.02 0.00 0.02 0.03 48% 52%
high ez 0.00 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.08 4% 96%
uncorrected output (UO) zero for all schools zero %
Table 10b. Incentives for pupil selection when changing the parental education distribution
change: attract pupils with highly educated parents (+1)
ideally: sj should be zero for all schools
p05 p25 p50 p75 p95 %<0 %>0
low e 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.07 0% 100%
ref. administration (RA) mid e -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03 48% 52%
high e -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 100% 0%
value added (VA) -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 52% 48%
ref. background (RB) zero for all schools zero %
uncorrected output (UO) -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04 16% 84%
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